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Journal of Logic and Computation Advance Access originally published online on September 21, 2007
Journal of Logic and Computation 2007 17(5):851-869; doi:10.1093/logcom/exm045
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© The Author, 2007. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Original Articles

A Causal Theory of Abduction

Alexander Bochman

Computer Science Department, Holon Academic Institute of Technology, Israel.

E-mail: bochmana{at}hit.ac.il

Received 25 January 2006.


  Abstract

The article provides a uniform representation of abductive reasoning in the logical framework of causal inference relations. The representation covers in a single framework not only traditional, ‘classical’ forms of abduction, but also abductive reasoning in diagnosis, theories of actions and change, and abductive logic programming.

Keywords: Abduction; causation; nonmonotonic reasoning


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