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Journal of Logic and Computation 1998 8(2):147-158; doi:10.1093/logcom/8.2.147
© 1998 by Oxford University Press
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Original Articles

Preferential Orders and Plausibility Measures

MICHAEL FREUND

University of Orleans, Dept of Mathematics 45067-Orleans-La Source, France E-mail: Michael.Freund{at}labomath.univ-orleans.fr

It is well known that preferential inference relations can be semantically represented through a smooth order defined on the set of states of a preferential model, but it is also possible to represent them via a preferential order, directly defined on the underlying language. In this paper, we study the link that exists between preferential orders and plausibility measures, and prove that any preferential order can be extended, in a canonical way, into a plausibility measure. This extended order has a natural intrepretation in the infinitary framework of deductive inference operations.

Keywords: Non-monotonic reasoning; preferential inference relations; deductive operations; plausibility structures; preferential orders


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