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Journal of Logic and Computation 2003 13(3):429-448; doi:10.1093/logcom/13.3.429
© 2003 by Oxford University Press
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Original Article

Persuasion in Practical Argument Using Value-based Argumentation Frameworks

Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon1

1 Department of Computer Science, The University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK. E-mail: tbc{at}csc.liv.ac.uk

In many cases of disagreement, particularly in situations involving practical reasoning, it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that either party is wrong. The role of argument in such cases is to persuade rather than to prove, demonstrate or refute. Following Perelman, we argue that persuasion in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of an argument depends on the social values that it advances, and that whether the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the comparative strength of the values advanced by the arguments concerned. To model this we extend the standard notion of Argumentation Frameworks (AFs) to Value-based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs). After defining VAFs we explore their properties, and show how they can provide a rational basis for the acceptance or rejection of arguments, even where this would appear to be a matter of choice in a standard AF. In particular we show that in a VAF certain arguments can be shown to be acceptable however the relative strengths of the values involved are assessed. This means that disputants can concur on the acceptance of arguments, even when they differ as to which values are more important, and hence that we can identify points for which persuasion should be possible. We illustrate the above using an example moral debate. We then show how factual considerations can be admitted to our framework and discuss the possibility of persuasion in the face of uncertainty and disagreement as to values.

Keywords: Argumentation, dialogue, persuasion, practical reasoning.


Received 15 June 2002.


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